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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, Geachte collega’s, Dames en Heren
  From the day we are old enough to recognize our faces in a mirror at 
least until senility sets in, we are obsessed with our looks. A six-year-old 
girl wants to have clothes like those of her "princess" dolls; a sub-teenage 
boy may insist on a haircut in the latest style ( just as I insisted on my 
crew-cut in 1955); twenty-somethings primp at length before a Saturday 
night out. Even after our looks, self-presentation and other characteris-
tics have landed us a mate, we still devote time and money to dyeing 
our hair, obtaining hair transplants, dressing in the clothes that we spent 
substantial amounts of time shopping for, and using cosmetics. Most 
days we carefully select the right outfits from our wardrobes and groom 
ourselves thoroughly.
  The average American husband spends 32 minutes on a typical day 
washing, dressing and grooming himself, while his married female coun-
terpart spends 44 minutes. There is no age limit for vanity: Among single 
American women ages 70 and over, for many of whom physical limitations 
might reduce the possibility of spending time grooming, we find 43 minutes 
devoted to this activity on a typical day1. Many assisted living facilities 
and nursing homes even offer on-site beauty salons. For most people 
grooming is an activity in which they are willing to invest substantial 
chunks of their lives.
  We not only spend time enhancing our appearance – we spend large 
sums of money on it too. In 2005 the average American household spent 
$754 on women’s and girls’ clothing, $440 on men’s and boys’ clothing, 
$892 on infants’ clothing, footwear and other apparel products and ser-
vices2, and $541 on personal care products and services.2 Such spending 
accounted for over 5 percent of all consumers’ spending that year, and it 
totaled roughly $450 billion. No doubt some of this spending is necessary 
just to avoid giving offense to family members, friends and others whom 
we meet; but that required minimal spending is far less than we actually 
do spend on items in these categories.
  There is nothing uniquely modern or American about these concerns 
about dress and personal beautification. Archaeological sites from 2500 
BCE Egypt yield evidence of jewelry and other body decoration, and traces 
of ochre and other body paints are readily available from Paleolithic sites 
1 The data on the time inputs are from the American Time Use Survey, 2003.
2  From the Consumer Expenditure Survey, as reported in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2008, 
Table 664.
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in southern France. People in other industrialized countries show similar 
concerns for their appearance and beauty early in the 21st century: For 
example, in 2001 German husbands spent 39 minutes grooming and 
dressing, while German wives spent 42 minutes in these activities, quite 
close to the American averages.3
  All well and good – the time and money we spend on it should en-
hance our interest in beauty and its effects, but is the concern of econo-
mists more than just a prurient one? Why should economists dive into 
these issues, other than the intellectual imperialism that has encou-
raged economists to expound on diverse topics from suicide to sumo 
wrestling, and sleep to commercial sex?4 Why should an economist have 
the chutzpah even to discuss beauty, and why should the intelligent layper-
son spend time paying attention to what an economist has to say about 
the topic? That time and money are spent on beauty is an insufficient 
reason for economists to be interested. If these were sufficient, there would 
be no aspect of human behavior that would be off limits for economic 
analysis.
  Take as given the notion that the scarcity of beauty arises from genetic 
differences in people’s looks, so that by some socially-determined criteria 
some people are viewed as better-looking than others. By its nature, 
beauty is scarce. Because it is scarce, we can identify a number of areas 
where differences in individuals’ beauty could influence economic outcomes 
directly. Markets for labor of a variety of types, perhaps even all labor 
markets, might generate premium pay for good looks and pay penalties 
for bad looks. The measurement of pay premia and penalties in different 
jobs and for people belonging to different demographic groups is a 
standard exercise among economic researchers. Doing so in the case of 
beauty is a straightforward application of this general endeavor. With every 
effect on price, in this case wage rates, which are the prices of workers’ 
time, there will be an effect on quantity. How a personal characteristic 
alters the distribution of workers across jobs and occupations is perfectly 
standard fodder for an economist, and beauty is surely a personal 
characteristic that could change the kinds of jobs and occupations that 
people enter.
3 Calculated from the 1991-92 Zeitbudgeterhebung. The category is "waschen oder anziehen."
4  Daniel Hamermesh, "An Economic Theory of Suicide," Journal of Political Economy, 82 (Jan./Feb. 1974), 
pp. 83-98; Mark Duggan and Steven Levitt, "Winning Isn’t Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling," 
American Economic Review, 92 (Dec. 2002), pp. 1594-1605; Jeff Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh, "Sleep 
and the Allocation of Time," Journal of Political Economy, 98 (Oct. 1990), pp. 922-943; Lena Edlund and 
Evelyn Korn, "A Theory of Prostitution," Journal of Political Economy, 110 (Feb. 2002), pp. 181-214.
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A characteristic like beauty that affects wages and employment will also 
affect the bottom line of companies and governments that employ workers 
whose looks differ. Are certain industries are likely to be more affected? 
How does the existence of concerns about beauty affect companies’ 
sales and profitability? Perhaps most important, how can companies 
survive if beauty is scarce and thus costly?
  Taking all of this together, the economic approach to beauty treats it 
as scarce and tradable. We trade beauty for additional income that enables 
us to raise our living standards (satisfy our desires for more things) and 
for such non-monetary characteristics of work and interpersonal relations 
as pleasant colleagues, an enjoyable workplace, etc., that also make us 
better off. Researchers in other disciplines, particularly social psychology, 
have generated massive amounts of research on beauty, occasionally tou-
ching on economic issues, particularly in marriage markets. But economists 
have added something special and new to this topic – a consistent view 
of exchange and value related to this unusual but central characteristic 
– beauty.
  I want to stress that this discussion is only very partial – I ignore such 
areas as credit markets, dating and marriage markets, and no doubt many 
others that already have been or soon will be researched. The main point 
is that only a little – albeit a very fascinating little – has been done so far; 
there is a lot more to do, and I hope that this lecture and my previous 
research in the area will have stimulated and continue to stimulate 
others to work in this area. I’m an old man; but there is lots of room for 
young people to do an immense amount of clever and interesting work 
on beauty and the economy.
What Is Beauty?
  One online dictionary gives three definitions of beauty that are relevant 
for our purposes:5
1   The quality or aggregate of qualities in a person or thing that gives 
pleasure to the senses or pleasurably exalts the mind or spirit
2  A beautiful person or thing; especially: a woman
3  A particularly graceful, ornamental, or excellent quality
5 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
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Although English usage describes good-looking men as handsome 
rather than beautiful, I generally avoid the terms "handsome" and its 
feminine equivalent, "pretty," and use the term beauty where these 
gender-specific terms might otherwise be employed. This excludes the 
second definition. The third definition seems specific to individual traits 
and insufficiently general to describe beauty in an economically useful 
way. I’ll thus go with the first definition.
  The difficulty with this definition is that it is completely vague – what 
is it that "gives pleasure to the senses or pleasurably exalts the mind or 
spirit"? The real question for our purposes is: Are your senses, mind or 
spirit pleasured or exalted by the same human characteristics as mine? 
Think about this issue the following way. Imagine this room being divided 
into two halves, with the audience members being equally productive 
employees, and with my wife (over there) and me being two employers 
producing identical products. Both my wife and I derive pleasure from 
having beautiful employees.
  To start, let’s say that my wife views the potential employees in the 
left-side of the audience as being good-looking, and those on the right-side 
as being ugly. I, on the other hand, view those on the right as being good-
looking, and those on the left as being ugly. That being the case, she will 
hire those on the left, and I’ll hire those on the right. Most important, 
neither she nor I will have to pay extra to indulge our preferences for 
beauty, because we are not competing for beauty. She gets what she 
wants, I get what I want. There’s no extra pay for beauty, because we 
don’t agree on what is beautiful.
  What if, however, my wife and I agree that those on the left are 
beautiful and those on the right are ugly? Then we will both be willing 
to pay extra to employ workers on the left. The amount of extra pay that 
the left-side workers receive will depend on how much my wife and I value 
their beauty. If I am more concerned about beauty, at some premium pay 
to left-side workers she will drop out of the bidding for their services. The 
beauty premium will be the extra pay that I am required to offer left-side 
workers to have the pleasure of employing them.
  The main point is that for there to be a beauty pay premium employers 
must at least to some extent agree on what is beautiful. So the question 
is: Do people agree on what is beautiful? There are two different ways to 
answer this question. The first, which has been used only rarely, is to look 
at how raters’ assessments of people’s beauty vary when they view the 
same individuals at different times. Answers using this approach can be 
seen from a study based on pictures of economists. I asked four students 
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who were just beginning their graduate studies in economics to rate the 
looks of 312 pictures of economists, many of whom were included multiple 
times and submitted a different photograph each time. Of course, the 
same individual received different ratings for different pictures, but those 
differences were small compared to the differences in the average ratings 
among different individuals.6
  In a nationally-representative study undertaken in Canada, in which 
the same people were interviewed in 1977, 1979 and 1981, each individual 
was contacted by a different interviewer in each year. The interviewers 
were asked to assess looks using a 5 to 1 scale:
 
5  Strikingly handsome or beautiful
4  Good-looking (above average for age and sex)
3  Average looks for age and sex
2  Quite plain (below average for age and sex)
1  Homely
  Comparing ratings in adjacent years, 54 percent of women and 54 
percent of men were rated identically in each of the two years; and only 
3 percent of women and 2 percent of men received a rating in the second 
year of a pair that differed by more than 1 from the rating they received 
in the first year of the pair.7
  The second way of testing for consistency in our views of others’ 
beauty is to ask a group of individuals to provide independent ratings 
of another person’s looks. Typically this has been done by showing each 
of a number of people, none of whom can contact the others, the same 
photograph. While there will be disagreements, the question is whether 
they are small, so that the averages inform us about general perceptions 
of each person’s looks.
  As an example, take ratings of a group of law students’ photos, which 
were assessed on this same 5 to 1 scale.8 Complete agreement – all four 
observers giving the exact same score to a photograph – was fairly un-
common, occurring in only 14 percent of the photos. But near agreement, 
6  Daniel Hamermesh, "Changing Looks and Changing Discrimination: The Beauty of Economists," 
Economics Letters, 93 (Dec. 2006), pp. 405-412.
7  These are calculated from some of the raw data analyzed in Daniel Hamermesh and Jeff Biddle, "Beauty 
and the Labor Market," American Economic Review, 84 (Dec. 1994), pp. 1174-1194.
8  These are calculated from the raw data analyzed in Jeff Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh, "Beauty, Pro-
ductivity and Discrimination: Lawyers’ Looks and Lucre," Journal of Labor Economics, 16 (Jan. 1998), pp. 
172-201.
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which I define as all four ratings the same, as three of four raters rating 
the picture identically, or as two pairs of raters who differ by only 1 
point on the scale, occurred with the photos of 67 percent of the female
students and 75 percent of the male photos. Only 2 of the 2221 students
were rated differently by all four raters. Complete disagreement 
about looks is an extraordinarily rare event. There are consistent dif-
ferences in how individuals rate each other’s beauty. Within the same 
culture some people are always harsh in rating their fellow citizens’ 
looks, and others are consistently more generous. In one study sixty 
interviewers rated at least ten subjects. The average ratings ranged 
from 3.64 (closer to above-average than to average) down to 2.40 (clo-
ser to plain than to average). But only 10 percent of the differences 
in the ratings of interviewees could be ascribed to judgments by raters 
who applied particularly harsh or generous standards. While interviewers 
do have different standards, the effects of their differences are dwarfed 
by the inherent differences in interviewees’ looks.
  In sum, human beauty is a subjective concept; but people have simi-
lar subjective notions of what constitutes beauty. There is an English-
language saying, "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder." That’s true; but 
people tend to behold others similarly. What this means for our purposes 
is that the second possibility in my artificial example above – my wife 
and I agreeing more or less that folks on the left side of the audience are 
the good-looking potential employees – is the likely outcome; and that 
means that there is good reason to expect premium pay for some (good-
looking) workers, and penalty pay for other (bad-looking) workers.
How Much Does Beauty Affect Earnings?
  The devil in this question is in the details of other factors that might 
be related to beauty and that have their own, independent effects on 
earnings. The choice of factors is essentially arbitrary, but a thorough 
approach would take anything that has been shown to affect earnings, 
and would then adjust for its impacts in order to isolate the effect of 
beauty on earnings. These other factors include: Education (increasing 
earnings); age (increasing earnings up to some point, perhaps to the 
mid-50s for a typical worker, then reducing earnings); health (healthier 
people earn more); intelligence (higher measured IQ increases earnings); 
trade union membership (increasing earnings); marital status (positive 
effects among men, negative effects among women); race/ethnicity (mi-
norities earn less than non-Hispanic whites); size of city (higher earnings 
in bigger cities and in metropolitan as opposed to non-metropolitan and 
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rural areas); region; nativity (immigrants earn less than natives); family 
background (lower among people whose parents were immigrants); size 
of company (higher in big firms) or plant (higher in larger plants); years 
with the company (increasing earnings until late in a person’s tenure 
with the company). Numerous studies have shown that each of these 
factors affects earnings. Since some or all might also be correlated with 
looks, to isolate the effect of looks on earnings we need to adjust earnings 
using data on as many of these other factors as we can obtain.
  Let’s take the example of the U.S., where this issue has been most 
thoroughly studied. Table 1 shows the average impacts of beauty combining 
data from two different random samples of Americans in the 1970s. All 
the percentage effects shown in the Table are for people rated below-
average (2 or 1 on the 5 to 1 scale, between 12 and 15 percent of the sample 
members) or above-average (4 or 5 on that scale, around 30 percent of 
the sample members) compared to those in the average group (people 
rated as 3, who constitute a majority of all workers). The penalties for 
below-average looks, and the premia for above-average looks, are based 
on statistical analyses that adjusted earnings for large numbers of the 
other factors in order to infer the effect of differences in beauty. Throug-
hout this table and all the others presented here an asterisk (*) denotes 
that the impact is statistically different from zero. The asterisk indicates 
that we can be fairly sure that looks have some effect on earnings.
Table 1  Best Estimates of the Percentage Impacts of Looks on Earnings 
in the U.S., 1970s (compared to average-looking workers, rated 3)
      Women   Men
Looks
Below Average (2 or 1)  -4.1*  -12.9*
Above Average (4 or 5)  7.8*  3.7
* Denotes an effect or difference that is statistically different from 0 here and in subsequent tables.
If asked, "What is the overall effect of looks on earnings in the U.S.?" the 
best answer, based on this Table, is that the bottom 15 percent of women 
by looks, those rated as below-average (2 or 1), received about 4 percent 
lower pay than average-looking women. The top one-third of women 
by looks, those rated as above-average (4 or 5), received about 8 percent 
more than average-lookers. For men the comparable figures are a 13 per-
cent penalty and a 4 percent premium.
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  These estimates mean little by themselves without comparisons to 
the effects of other determinants of differences in earnings. How does 
the 17 percent excess of good-looking men’s earnings over those of bad-
looking men’s compare to the effects of differences in other characteristics 
on men’s earnings? How does the 12 percent shortfall of plain or homely 
women’s earnings compare to other effects on women’s earnings? By far 
the most thoroughly examined factor affecting earnings is education. A 
good estimate for the U.S. today is that each additional year of schooling 
raises the earnings of otherwise identical workers by around 10 percent, 
with effects that are smaller, but still substantial in northern European 
countries.9 This effect is about the same as that of women’s good looks; 
and it implies that men’s good looks have an impact on their earnings at 
least as large as an additional 1-1/2 years of school.
  There have been many efforts to measure the effect of beauty on 
earnings in other countries, regrettably, to my knowledge, none for the 
Netherlands. Interest in the topic is hardly limited just to the United States. 
All of these have tried to adjust for many of the same determinants of 
earnings that were used to isolate the effects of beauty in the U.S. The 
availability of information on all these measures differs across countries 
and sets of data, so that the studies are neither entirely comparable to 
those from the U.S. nor to each other. They are also not comparable for 
another crucial reason: There are international differences in the willing-
ness of raters of beauty to classify people as being below-average in 
looks, with Americans being unusually willing to make these relatively 
harsh judgments when they interview respondents or evaluate their 
photographs. This too might cause the estimated effects of beauty else-
where to differ from those in the U.S.
  Table 2 assembles the results of a number of studies of the general 
impact of beauty in foreign labor markets. For each study the table lists 
the percentage effect of being below- or above-average in looks compared 
to the average-looking worker. It also lists in parentheses the percentage
of workersclassified as below- or above-average in looks. Not all the 
estimated effects make sense: In a few cases the statistical analyses 
suggest that the below-average looking earn more than the average, or 
that the above-average looking earn less than the average. These cases, 
though, are few; and in none of them is the surprising effect statistically 
different from zero.
9   The 10 percent figure comes from a multivariate regression estimated over a large random sample of 
Americans in 2007 (from the Current Population Survey, Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups). The true 
figure is probably much higher for the gains from finishing high school, or finishing university.
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  Most of the results in Table 2 show that in other countries too there 
are significant negative impacts on earnings of being below-average in 
looks. In most cases there are also significant positive effects of being 
above-average. No generalizations about cross-country differences in the 
effects of beauty on earnings are possible. But it is true that the negative 
effects of being below-average in looks typically (although the Korean 
results are the exception) exceed the positive effects of being above-
average. One explanation is that so few people are classified as below-
average in these studies. Even if a person in the 10th percentile of beauty 
is penalized to no greater degree than a person at the 90th percentile is 
rewarded, the statistical analysis would show that the penalty for the 
relatively few people rated below-average exceeds the premium for the 
substantial fraction of people who are rated above-average.
Table 2  Percentage Effects of Looks on Hourly Earnings (and Percent  
of Workers Rated Below- or Above-Average), Various Countries
MEN WOMEN
Looks: 
Penalty Premium Penalty Premium
Below-Average Above-Average  Below-Average Above-Average
Canada 
-12.9* 11.5* 13.0 13.8
(8%)  (34%) (9%) (33%)
Shanghai 
-24.6* 2.9  -31.1* 9.7*
(2%)  (32%) (2%) (34%)
Australia 
-18.0* -3.1 -3.2 -6.9
 (3%)  (38%) (6%) (41%)
United Kingdom 
-13.8* 0.6 -10.3 -2.3
(2%) (24%) (2%)  (36%)
Korea 
-1.0 10.1* -1.0 8.8*
(11%)  (5%)  (8%) (13%)
Source: Daniel Hamermesh and Jeff Biddle, 1994; Daniel Hamermesh, Xin Meng and Junsen 
Zhang, "Dress for Success – Does Primping Pay?" Labour Economics, 9 (Oct. 2002), pp. 361-373; An-
drew Leigh and Jeff Borland, "Unpacking the Beauty Premium: Is It Looks or Ego?" unpublished 
paper, Australian National University, 2007; Barry Harper, "Beauty, Stature and the Labor Market: 
A British Cohort Study," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62 (Dec. 2000), pp. 771-800; 
Soohyung Lee and Keunkwan Ryu, "Returns to Plastic Surgery and the Marriage and Labor Market," 
unpublished paper, University of Maryland – College Park, 2009.
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  As discussed, making comparisons of these effects to those shown in 
Table 1 for the U.S. is difficult for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, the ef-
fects of beauty in other countries do not seem that different from those in 
the U.S. The effects in the U.S. may be somewhat larger, but not hugely so. 
As in the U.S., so too in most of these countries, good looks are rewarded, 
and bad looks are penalized, even after accounting for a large variety of 
other factors that affect earnings.
Men’s Beauty and Women’s Beauty – Why Different Effects?
  The astute reader will note from Tables 1 and 2 that it seems like men’s 
looks have bigger effects on their earnings than do women’s. How can 
 this be, given the apparent pre-occupation in most cultures with female 
beauty? Why doesn’t beauty have a bigger impact on women’s earnings 
than on men’s? There are two, unrelated reasons, and I would like to go 
through each of them separately.
  Ask what we would observe if both genders faced the same penalty 
on their earnings, say 10 percent for being below-average, and the same 
premium for having above-average looks, say 5 percent. Assume too that 
all adults were working for pay. What if there were also no differences by 
gender in the underlying distributions of beauty ratings? Then it would 
be the case that careful measurements of the effects of beauty on earnings 
would show the same results for women and men.
  This point sounds reasonable, but it is wrong, because the assumption 
that all adults work is incorrect: As an example, in 2008 only 82 percent 
of Dutch women age 25 to 54 were in the labor force, while 94 percent 
of Dutch men in that age group were. The difference exists in all wealthy 
countries. This difference in labor-market participation would not be a 
problem here if non-participation were random – if the choice of staying 
out of the labor market were unrelated to beauty. But it is reasonable to 
expect that the choice is not random. The economic theory of participa-
ting in the labor force – of working or seeking work – states that people 
choose to work if the gains from working exceed the gains from staying 
at home. The gains from working are what you can earn. The gains from 
staying at home are the enjoyment of your leisure, the value to you and 
your family of what you do while at home and the savings of costs for 
commuting and child care.
  So if being plain or homely reduces earnings, it reduces the incentive 
to be in the labor market, and it increases the likelihood of remaining 
at home. Then since not everyone works for pay, the people who are out 
of the labor market are those whose looks are generally below average 
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for their age. Those remaining in the labor market tend to be among the 
better looking. Even this non-randomness wouldn’t be able to explain 
gender differences in the impact of beauty on earnings if men and women 
were equally responsive to the incentives to work. But massive amounts of 
economic evidence demonstrate that women’s decisions about whether 
to work for pay are more responsive to pay incentives than are men’s10.
  This is all economic theory and is indirect, with the causation moving 
from beauty to labor-force participation, as affected by what people can 
earn, to the earnings that we observe among those people who choose 
to work. Is there any evidence that, in fact, beauty affects the likelihood 
that women work, with little or no effect on men? One of the American 
data sets from the 1970s and the Canadian data set from 1977-81 allow 
us to infer the effects of beauty on whether women or men will choose 
to work or not. In both sets of data there is no effect of looks, either 
above- or below-average beauty, on whether a man is working for pay. 
But being above-average in looks raises the likelihood that a woman 
works by about 5 percent compared to the average-looking woman. And
the relatively small fraction of women whose looks are rated below-average 
are about 5 percent less likely than average-looking women to be in the 
labor market (and that much more likely to stay at home). The effects of 
looks on a woman’s likelihood of working are not small, given that the 
average-looking adult woman in the U.S. today has only a 60 percent 
chance of working for pay.
  This discussion shows that one explanation for the surprisingly larger 
effect of looks on men’s than on women’s earnings is that women have 
much more latitude than men in choosing whether or not to work for pay, 
and that beauty affects that choice. Part of the reason for the gender 
difference in the effects of beauty on earnings is that beauty alters the 
mix of female workers, so that the distribution of workers contains propor-
tionately fewer below-average and more above-average looking women. 
The same is not true for men.
  The other reason why the wage effects are less for women than men 
is that there is another important market where looks are traded for 
economic gains – the market for spouses. Bad-looking women are no 
less likely than good-looking women to be married; but the interesting 
question is about the characteristics of the husbands each group 
10  Compare, for example, the surveys of empirical evidence by John Pencavel, and by James Heckman and 
Mark Killingsworth, in Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 1. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986; and the survey by Richard Blundell and Thomas MaCurdy in Ashen-
felter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1999.
Beauty16
obtains. Consider how beauty is exchanged in marriage for the partner’s 
other characteristics, particularly his/her earnings capacity. Table 3 
shows the relationship between one’s spouse’s beauty and one’s own 
education. I focus on education since it is probably the most impor-
tant determinant of earnings potential in most developed countries. 
The data for the United States are from surveys collected in the 1970s, 
while those for China are from a 1995 survey in Shanghai. For China I 
have combined below- and average-looking individuals, since very few 
respondents were classified as below-average.
  The data show that, except for the comparison of good-looking to 
average-looking wives in the U.S., beauty has the expected effect on the 
education level of the spouse you have matched with. Below-average 
looking individuals match with spouses with less education. In the 
American data this is especially true for women in the bottom 15 percent 
of looks: Their husbands have on average one less year of schooling than 
other husbands. A husband’s bad looks are less strongly related to his 
wife’s education. These effects do not arise from differences in the spou-
ses’ ages or from differences in their health, as the estimates adjust for 
both of these factors. They result from sorting among spouses, from the 
exchange of characteristics in the marital match.
  The effects are not small. The discussion of beauty in the labor market 
showed that an extra year of schooling is associated with about 10 percent 
extra earnings among men. As compared to an average-looking woman, 
the estimates in Table 3 suggest that a below-average looking woman 
is married to a man who will bring about 11 percent (10 percent per year 
times 1.1 = 12.4 – 11.3 years) less earnings into the household. If men on 
average earn 50 percent more than women, this means that this is the 
same effect as an earnings penalty on her wages arising from her bad 
looks of over 15 percent.
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Table 3  Looks and Spouse’s Education in Married Couples, U.S.  
and Shanghai
United States Shanghai
Spouse’s Looks
Years of School of: Percent with high-school or more:
Husband Wife Husband Wife
Above-average  12.4 12.8* 59* 49
Average 12.4 12.4
 50 46
Below-average 11.3*  11.9*
(below- or average in China)
*Denotes statistically different from the average spouse.
  Although measured differently, the Chinese results are very similar 
to those from the U.S. 59 percent of above-average-looking wives have 
husbands with at least a high-school diploma, while only 50 percent of 
average- or below-average-looking women do. As in the U.S., the differences 
between their wives’ education of men classified by looks are smaller. 
Again, education seems to be traded for looks; and it is men’s education 
in particular, which is positively related to their earnings potential, that 
is traded for feminine beauty.
  These calculations also help to explain the apparently surprising 
lesser impact of beauty on women’s earnings than on men’s. Women’s 
major additional income disadvantage arises because the husbands they 
match with earn substantially less than the husbands of better-looking 
women. The bad-looking women thus share in fewer resources in marriage 
than their good-looking counterparts.
Beauty in Different Occupations
You are not going to choose to become an opera singer unless you have 
some natural vocal gifts; and you are not going to become a professional 
tennis player unless you have at least some basic level of physical coor-
dination. These are fairly esoteric occupations with few practitioners. 
Unlike vocal ability or physical coordination, beauty is a general characteristic. 
Does your beauty affect the occupation you choose to enter, as the cartoon 
in Figure 1 suggests? It seems reasonable to believe that your beauty 
will help to determine the career choices that you make as a worker. 
Put crudely, does the old saying, "A beautiful face for radio," describe 
people’s behavior generally?
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Figure 1
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  This discussion makes it sound like some occupations will have only 
good-looking workers, others only plain people. Going still further, why 
doesn’t the very best-looking one percent of workers enter the occupation 
that rewards beauty most generously? Why don’t the ugliest ten percent 
of workers wind up in those occupations where looks matter least? If 
people behaved this way, the effects of looks on earnings and on other 
outcomes within each occupation would be imperceptible, or at most 
tiny, since the distinctions among the looks of people in each occupation 
would be minute.
  People do not choose to enter occupations based solely on their looks 
and on the potential productivity of their looks in various occupations. 
We would expect that being good-looking would help an opera singer. 
Yet not all opera singers are beautiful. Indeed, the greatest soprano of 
the 20th century, Maria Callas, was no beauty at all. Whatever her lack of 
good looks may have cost in success was far more than compensated by 
her extraordinary voice and musicality. As a more recent example, Dustin 
Hoffman’s aunt told him, "You can’t be an actor; you’re too ugly." Yet two 
Best Actor Oscars have made it clear that looks are not the only thing 
that determines success in screen acting.11
We choose our occupations based on the mix of our skills, interests and 
endowments, of which looks are just one among many. That choice is 
partly based on the importance attached to these different skills and 
endowments by the market, and beauty is only one of the many things 
that are favored by the market. And it is favored differently in different 
occupations. We will thus find that workers within an occupation are not 
homogeneous in looks. We will, though, find less variation in looks within 
an occupation than in the workforce as a whole. On average, better-look-
ing people will choose occupations where their looks are productive, and 
worse-looking people will shy away from those occupations.
  Some evidence for attorneys in different specialties demonstrates 
this fact. Take a set of attorneys, all of whom graduated from the same 
prestigious American law school in the 1980s, and all of whom were ob-
served working in legal careers in the early 1990s.12 Table 4 lists the aver-
age beauty (standardized so that the overall average for the entire set 
was zero) of the attorneys classified by their legal specialty. Some legal 
specialties require more contact with non-attorneys than others. In some 
11 Abigail Pogrebin, Stars of David. New York: Broadway Books, 2005, p. 10.
12 From Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998.
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other specialties the lawyer works essentially "in the back room." The table 
shows clearly that attorneys who are litigators – who must negotiate 
with other attorneys and must appear before judges and juries – are better 
looking than their peers. And the worst-looking attorneys are those who 
do regulatory and administrative law – and who are thus least likely to 
have to appear in court.
Table 4  Averages of Beauty by Legal Specialty, Attorneys in Year 5 of 
their Careers, During the 1990s
Litigation Corporate and 
Financial 
Regulation and 
Administrative
Other
Men, 1980s Cohort Year 5
Beauty .0099 -.0577 -.1311 -.0525
N = 133 366 113 145
Women, 1980s Cohort Year 5
Beauty .2506 .2168 .0032 .0500
N = 56 126 46 57
  This evidence shows that people do sort themselves according to their 
looks among occupations when choosing their careers – even among 
narrow specialties within an occupation. Nonetheless, a huge number 
of studies for a large variety of occupations have shown that beauty 
has independent effects on earnings and other outcomes. Consider 
first the attorneys whose beauty by legal specialty is shown in Table 4. 
In Table 5 I list the effects on their earnings, after accounting for many 
other factors that affect earnings, of a move from the median beauty in 
the sample to the 84th percentile of looks. Except right when they start 
their careers, differences in their beauty have statistically significant 
effects on their earnings. And these effects are not small: Five years after 
receiving their law degrees the attorney who is in the 84th percentile of 
looks is earning 4 percent more than his average-looking counterpart; 
and by fifteen years after the degree that difference has widened to 
6.5 percent. Moreover, as the final column shows, it’s not just that the 
better-looking attorneys are working more hours (presumably because 
they attract more clients); even adjusting for hours worked, the better-
looking attorneys are earning 5.5 percent more per hours.
Dr. Daniel S. Hamermesh 21
Table 5  Estimates of Percentage Effects of Beauty on Annual Earnings, 
Law School Year 15 Sample, 623 Men
Year 1 Year 5
Stdzd. Beauty
(Move from Average To 84th Percentile)
 0.69 3.96*
Year 15 Year 15  
(adjusts for hours)
Stdzd. Beauty 
(Move from Average To 84th Percentile)
6.49* 5.56*
  An occupation that particularly interests me is that of professors. The 
outcome is not their pay – it’s how their students evaluate their teaching. 
Nonetheless, there may be a link between these evaluations and pay 
and/or promotion. University administrators claim that they pay off for 
good teaching, and, rightly or wrongly, most universities use teaching 
evaluations as a major input in their judgments of teaching quality. That 
better teaching performance generates higher pay is a mantra among 
university administrators – after all, they do need to make the customers 
believe that their opinions about the service-providers matter.13
Table 6  Teaching Evaluations (Measured on a 5 to 1 Scale),  
Moving from the 16th to the 84th Percentile of Looks
Undergraduate Teaching Level
Percentile of looks All Lower Division Upper Division
16 3.84 3.81 3.88
50 4.05 4.10 4.00
84 4.26 4.39 4.12
  
13  Statistical evidence in favor of the notion that teaching quality affects salary is offered by William J. 
Moore, Robert Newman and Geoffrey Turnbull, "Do Academic Salaries Decline with Seniority?" Journal 
of Labor Economics, 16 (April 1998), pp. 352-366, who demonstrate the link between receipt of teaching 
awards and salary. The evidence on the impact of teaching evaluations is less direct, but my perso-
nal experiences in evaluating young faculty for tenure and both junior and senior faculty for teaching 
awards suggest that evaluations receive a lot, perhaps even too much attention in these processes.
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In a study using professors at the University of Texas at Austin, with the 
looks rated by students who had never seen those professors, we found 
that the average student evaluation differed sharply by the professors’ 
looks. 14 The good-looking professors received instructional evaluations 
that were substantially higher than those obtained by their worse-looking 
colleagues. The sizes of the effects of beauty on course evaluations are 
implied in Table 6, where I list the average student evaluation (5 is best, 1 is 
worst) going from the 16th to the 84th percentile of professors’ looks. 
Moving from the bottom sixth of looks to the top sixth yields an effect 
equal to one standard deviation in the evaluations. And the effects are 
even bigger if we go from the very ugliest professor in the sample, who 
would get an instructional rating of 3.52, to the best-looking professor, 
who would attain an average instructional evaluation of 4.50.
  A similar approach was undertaken using instructional ratings of 
German university professors.15 The author argued that American 
students’ ratings of their professors, and Americans’ ratings of people looks, 
may differ and be related differently from those in other countries. Cer-
tainly, Americans appear to scale their ratings of people’s looks differently 
from citizens of other countries. As in the American study, the ratings of 
beauty by one group of students (who were not in the professors’ classes) 
were statistically significantly related to the evaluations that the German 
instructors received from the (different) students in their classes. While the 
impacts were not as large as those in the American study, they were 
still substantial. No doubt the results would be different still in other 
countries, for other kinds of students and using different methods. 
Nonetheless, it does appear that, even in an occupation like college 
teaching, where we don’t think beauty will be very important, differences 
in beauty produce impacts on an outcome that is arguably linked to 
economic rewards.
Does It Pay to Become Beautiful? Can We Make Ourselves Beautiful?
  Given this evidence that it pays to be beautiful, why don’t people invest 
more in themselves, become better-looking and earn more? That people 
are spending on beauty – spending both time and money – along a whole 
variety of dimensions is clear. The question is whether this spending 
pays off.
14  Daniel Hamermesh and Amy Parker, 'Beauty in the Classroom: Instructors’Pulchritude and Putative 
Pedagogical Productivity,' Economics of Education Review, 24 (Aug. 2005), pp. 369-376.
15  Bernd Süssmuth, 'Beauty in the Classroom: Are German Students Less Blinded?' Applied Economics, 
38 (Feb. 2006), pp. 231-238.
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Perhaps the spending does pay off, but the costs of the improvement, 
both in money terms and in pain and suffering, are insufficient to induce 
people to undergo the surgery. These possibilities are suggested by some 
results describing examples of plastic surgery in Korea. For most people 
in the study the economic gains from the improvements in beauty were 
very far from justifying the monetary cost of the procedure.16
  If plastic surgery cannot convert us all to beauties, or we cannot afford 
the cost of surgery, or we don’t want to bear the pain of the surgery that 
would be required to accomplish this, maybe a simpler approach would 
work: Buy better clothing, use more cosmetics, get better coiffed, etc. 
Magazines and newspaper columns are devoted to "dressing for success" 
and "beauty makeovers," including recommendations of the appropriate 
clothing, hair style, manicure, etc. Does this kind of spending really work? 
Can we make ourselves more beautiful by spending more on non-surgical 
methods of beauty enhancement?
  The survey that underlay the information from Shanghai shown in 
Tables2 and 3 collected information on the amount that women spent 
each month on clothing, cosmetics and hair care. Figure 2 shows the re-
lationship between a woman’s average beauty rating and her monthly 
beauty spending. Comparing a woman who spent the average of 88 
yuan to another who spent nothing, her spending only raised her looks 
from a rating of 3.31 to 3.36 on the five-point beauty scale. One might 
think that these women could do better by spending still more, and it 
is true that spending 400 yuan, over 20 percent of average household 
income, would raise the rating of the average woman’s beauty to 3.56. 
But the data make it very clear that the extra effect of this spending di-
minishes the more one has already spent. More important, the average 
economic payoff to spending was only 4 cents per 100 spent.
  Just as much of our spending on health may not increase our longevity, 
but may let us enjoy life more, so too it may make sense to spend on 
plastic surgery and better clothes. But the best reason for this kind of 
spending is that it makes you happier. It is not a good investment if you 
seek only the narrow goal of economic improvement.
  Additional evidence fortifies this conclusion: A small-scale study took 
pictures of people at an early age and asked raters to rate them and photos 
of the same people taken much later in life. The ratings were very highly 
correlated across the subjects’ lifetimes. 
 
16 Lee and Ryu, 2009.
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The general conclusion is, "Ugly ducklings generally blossom into ugly 
ducks."17 Beauty is essentially immutable – the ugly are stuck with their 
disability.
  Someday technology may allow us to reach the point where we can 
improve our beauty easily and without great cost. Right now, though, we 
are so far away from that point that for most of us the beauty that we 
have attained as young adults is not going to be greatly altered by natural 
changes that occur as we age, nor by any surgical or cosmetic efforts 
that we undertake to improve it. We are basically stuck with what nature 
and perhaps early nurture have given us.
Figure 2  Relation Between Cosmetics/Clothing Spending and  
Appearance, Shanghai, 1995
How Can a Company Survive if It Pays Extra for Beauty?
  In discussing with a class of first-year university students whether 
having good-looking salespeople raises a company’s sales, I asked whether 
the students cared about the looks of employees at the companies they 
dealt with. One young woman said that she certainly does care, and that, 
for example, she would not buy cosmetics from a salesperson who was 
17 Elaine Hatfield and Susan Sprecher, Mirror, Mirror. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, p. 282.
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not well groomed and at least decent-looking. The brand of cosmetics 
that she chooses to buy may be the same no matter who sells it. But 
presumably the saleswoman’s looks would convey something to my 
student and others about the product, which would make buying it more 
or less desirable to her.
  This suggests an answer to one of the questions I posed at the start of 
this lecture: How can a company that pays extra for good-looking workers
survive in competition with companies that choose not to pay this pre-
mium and hence have lower labor costs? A good-looking attorney might 
be able to attract more clients and bill more hours, at higher hourly fees, 
if potential clients believe that s/he is more likely to be successful on 
their behalf. The attorney may be no better at writing briefs, doing legal 
research or developing oral arguments, but clients may believe that s/he 
will be more likely to prevail before a judge or jury, or in negotiations with 
other attorneys. In a very real sense the product in the former example, 
and the service in the latter, are inextricably tied to the salesperson’s or 
service provider’s looks.
  If we think of looks as part of a product or service, and if we assume 
that potential customers value looks, then it is clear how better-looking 
employees can raise a competitive company’s sales. At the same aver-
age cost of all the other inputs into the product and at the same price 
charged, customers will be more likely to buy the product and/or will be 
willing to buy more of it. More will be sold; and the company will expand 
at the expense of its competitors. Alternatively, what if the company has 
some monopoly power over the sale of its product or service? Tying its 
product or service to a better-looking provider will enable the company 
to sell it at a higher price and/or sell more of it, even though the product 
is little different from a product offered by another company. Regard-
less of the structure of the markets in which it operates, the company 
that can tie its goods and services to better-looking workers will be able 
to increase its price, the amount it sells, or both, and thus increase its 
revenue – the total value of its sales. The beauty of the seller becomes an 
integral part of what the company offers.
 A good example of how beauty affects a company’s revenue is a study 
of Dutch advertising executives that Gerard Pfann and two other co-authors 
did with me. 18At the time covered by the data (the mid-1980s through 
mid-1990s) the Dutch advertising industry contained many companies, 
18  Gerard Pfann, Jeff Biddle, Daniel Hamermesh and Carina Bosman, "Business Success and Businesses’ 
Beauty Capital," Economics Letters, 67 (May 2000), pp. 201-207.
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with most of them, including nearly all the larger firms, located in the 
Randstad. Because the nature of the markets they served differed bet-
ween this area and the rest of the country, and because they differed 
by size, we divided the advertising companies into four types along two 
criteria: Randstad or rest-of-country, and large (10 or more employees) 
or small firms. Over half of all sales were by large firms in the Randstad. 
Thus while the industry was competitive, in the sense that there were 
many firms, with no single firm having a market share even approaching 
10 percent, many of the companies had niches where they had some 
market power – some ability to set price.
Table 7  The Percentage Effect of an Increase in Advertising Executives’ 
Beauty on Sales, the Netherlands, 1984-94
Large Firms Small Firms
Effect of Move from Average to 84th Percentile of Beauty:
Area: Randstad 9.64* -7.50*
Other 9.12* 13.31*
  The beauty of the companies’ directors was rated on the 5 to 1 scale by 
a group of Dutch adults. These executives direct their company, engage 
in creative activities, and market their products. The impacts of an increase 
in their average beauty on their company’s sales, adjusted for the com-
pany’s size, are shown in Table 7. Except among small advertising firms 
in the Randstad, where the effect of beauty on sales was surprisingly 
negative, a company that had better-looking executives had higher total 
sales. Combining all companies together, moving from the 16th to the 
84th percentile of average looks of executives across the companies is 
associated with an increase in sales of 7 percent. If we delete the ano-
malous results for small firms in the Randstad, the effect is 10 percent. 
Having better-looking executives in a company in this industry generates 
fairly substantial increases in revenue.
  These effects are very large; but how do they compare to the possible 
effects of beauty on what a company has to pay to its (good-looking) 
workers? The answer is clear: Given the estimates in Tables 1 and 2, the 
extra costs of beautiful workers are more than offset by the extra reve-
nue that their good looks generate for their employers. The net effect is 
that the beauty generates additional profits.
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The point of this section is contained perfectly in the cartoon in 
Figure 3. It suggests that the supposed new manager is just not capable 
of bringing in more business and inducing subordinates to work harder. 
She may have the same education and the same tangible skills as the 
good-looking incumbent seated at the desk, but her obviously deficient 
looks would make her less productive, in the sense that she would not 
generate as much revenue for the company.
Figure 3 De Tijd, July 28, 2000.
Beauty28
Public Policy Toward Beauty?
  You might ask: Why would anyone think that beauty and its treatment in
the labor and other markets is a matter for public policy? Most industrialized
societies have instituted policies designed to protect disadvantaged 
citizens in a variety of areas. These include the labor market, the housing 
market and rights of access to public facilities. Protected groups include 
racial, ethnic and religious minorities; women; older citizens; and disabled 
citizens. In some places protection is also provided based on sexual 
orientation. The question here is whether it would make sense to offer 
similar protection for what one journalist I talked with called the "looks-
challenged" citizen – for example, the ten to fifteen percent of citizens 
whose looks are considered by their peers to be below average, or perhaps 
only the one to two percent who are considered homely.
  Are there good arguments for providing these protections? Do the 
potential benefits outweigh the potential costs? That there are likely to 
be benefits seems certain, since most proposed policies generate some 
benefit to at least some people. Whether other citizens might be disad-
vantaged by those policies – whether the policies generate unintended 
negative consequences for society as a whole – is always a more difficult 
question to answer. But it needs to be addressed when any new policy 
proposal is presented. That is especially true in the case of beauty, given 
the novelty of the idea of protecting this particular group.
  First of all, is beauty an immutable characteristic, like race or gender; or 
can the ugly easily alter their negative circumstances? The answer on this 
is clear from the evidence of the value of plastic surgery and cosmetics/ 
clothing – beauty, while not immutable, is changed only with great 
difficulty, and the possible changes are quite small.
If we offered protection to the ugly, would people take it? Who would admit 
to being ugly? The answer on this is clear: With a sufficient financial 
incentive, people will be happy to join the class of protected citizens. 
Given that the beauty penalties on earnings discussed here amount to a 
lifetime earnings loss of perhaps $250,000 in the United States, recovering 
that amount would seem like a more than sufficient incentive for a 
person to seek help.
One might argue that courts and regulatory agencies could never agree on 
who might be qualified to receive help – who is among the protected 
ugly. But the discussion here has made it clear that we do agree on who 
is beautiful – and who is ugly. Not perfectly, but sufficiently closely that 
there should be no trouble identifying who might be in a protected group.
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Given these considerations, why not protect the ugly – offer equal pay 
programs, monetary compensation, and penalties on employers who 
refuse to hire and promote ugly workers? After all, the source of their 
disability is all of us – all consumers, employers and citizens generally 
who prefer to deal with better-looking people and who must be compen-
sated, in the form of lower wages, to deal with bad-looking salespeople, 
workers and fellow employees.
  On its own merits protecting the ugly through legislation and regu-
lation seems as reasonable as protection for racial, ethnic and gender 
groups. And if there were no side-effects of that protection, I would very 
much favor it. But I do not. The reason is simple: Protection of yet another 
group is likely to detract from the political energy needed to protect other 
groups. This is a political opinion, not an economic analysis. But there is 
no doubt in my mind that political willpower is scarce. That being so, the 
question becomes where we want to spend that scarce resource. My own 
preference – and others will surely differ – is to spend it elsewhere, in the 
United States particularly on racial minorities. In other countries, with 
which I am less familiar, I have little doubt that there are groups that are 
more deserving of legislative and administrative protections than the in-
digenous ugly.
The Future of Beauty
  Before thinking about the future of beauty, we need to think about 
its past. Why is it that humans generally react positively to what I trust 
I have shown are the generally agreed-upon characteristics that lead us 
to say that some people are good-looking? Popular books have tried to 
explain the biological basis for this behavior or to exhort people to grow 
out of what is viewed as a concern for something that should no longer 
be relevant for purely biological purposes.19 Beauty may have been cor-
related with health, and thus reproductive fitness, before the Industrial 
Revolution. But in rich countries today, and in much of the rest of the 
world too, most people obtain sufficient nourishment that their physio-
gnomies are not impaired, so that variations over a wide range of looks 
do not indicate variations in health and the ability to reproduce.  
  So why does beauty still matter in most of our economic transactions? 
I believe the answer is that our reaction to beauty – the rewards that 
employers pay because customers and other employees like having good- 
19  Nancy Etcoff, Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty. New York: Doubleday, 1999; Naomi Wolf, 
The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women. New York: Anchor Books, 1992.
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looking people around them, as do the employers themselves – is an ata-
vism. We are programmed to like the symmetry of face – the symmetry 
of features – that is what typically describes a person who is generally 
regarded as good-looking.20 Our attitudes toward human beauty are 
leftovers from days when human beauty was more than an aesthetic 
issue.
  Where will we be one hundred years from now – will this atavism 
disappear, or, at least, will it cease having pervasive economic effects? 
In economics the best way of predicting is to use rational-expectations 
forecasts. The studies for the U.S. cited in Table 1 are based on data from 
the 1970s, and some of those summarized in Table 2 use data from the 
early 2000s. I don’t see much of a trend in this admittedly tiny sample of
research. That being the case, I doubt that beauty will disappear as a 
determinant of economic outcomes. The good-looking will continue to 
be favored, both monetarily and in other exchanges; the bad-looking will 
be disfavored.
  Does this mean that the bad-looking are hopelessly disadvantaged? 
The answer is yes and no. The answer would be yes, in the sense that the 
rapidly-expanding body of research that I have presented makes it clear 
that bad-looking people generally earn less than good-looking people 
who are otherwise identical. There are other areas of economic activity 
that I have not discussed where the same disadvantages exist and that 
have been and will be demonstrated by future research.
  The answer would be no, in the sense that looks are only one of the 
many earnings-enhancing characteristics that people possess. As the 
title of an advice article in a magazine for middle-aged women sug-
gests, "Make the Most of Your Looks."21 If I am bad-looking, I will avoid 
occupations (movie actor?) where my bad looks will penalize me greatly. 
Instead, I will choose an occupation where the skills that I possess in 
abundance have a chance to bring me the biggest rewards, both mone-
tary and non-monetary, and where the rewards for the good looks that 
I lack are less important. So yes, plain people are penalized; but they can 
and should structure their careers to avoid the worst effects of those pe-
nalties. In the end, bad looks are a disadvantage and are likely to remain 
so. But they are not a crucial disadvantage, not something that cannot 
be partly overcome.
20  Judith Langlois, Jean Ritter, Lori Roggman and Lesley Vaughn, "Facial Diversity and Infant Preferences 
for Attractive Faces," Developmental Psychology, 27 (Jan. 1991), pp. 79-84; Judith Langlois and Lori Rogg-
man, "Attractive Faces Are Only Average," Psychological Science, 1 (March 1990), pp. 115-21.
21 More, October 2008, p. 143.
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Apologia and Thank Yous
  As you may have noticed, I am more than slightly older than the typical 
person giving an inaugural oration. You might wonder: What is going on 
here? I have been teaching in universities since 1968, and I became the 
American equivalent of hoogleraar in 1976. (In the U.S. that is called a 
full professor; I call it a dead-end job.) For this reason of extreme age, as 
proud as I am of taking up this position, this lecture does not represent 
achieving a new pinnacle in the same way that it has for so many others.
  What this lecture, and my new position as professor of labor econo-
mics at Maastricht University, do represent is a new stage of my life – a 
chance to try my skills at teaching and research in a different environment 
from that in which I have operated for so many years. You might ask: "Why 
Maastricht?" There are several answers, but without doubt the main one 
is my friendship and collegiality with your own Professor Gerard Pfann. 
I believe Gerard invited me to a conference that took place in Amsterdam 
in January 1992. We spent a lot of time chatting about work and about 
life, and I realized (and I think he did too) that we both enjoyed each 
other’s company and could benefit from doing joint research.
  Gerard invited me to spend a month in Maastricht in Summer 1994, 
and I have been back many times since. During this period he and I have 
worked on and published a number of papers together, including three 
on labor demand (one of my four major areas of research over the last 
45 years), one on the economics of beauty and one on academic labor 
markets (two of my other main areas of concentration). At this point Ge-
rard is my modal coauthor; and, given my advanced age, I should think he 
will remain so. It has, I believe, been a productive scholarly relationship. 
As important, it has resulted in our families becoming increasingly close. 
Given that my sons are nearly middle-aged adults, and our grandchildren 
are only just entering adolescence, it has been a pleasure to watch Sara, 
Thomas and Florens grow up. And it has been a pleasure spending time 
with Carina and the kids, and to have them spend time in Austin. So to 
the entire Pfann-Furnée family, my thanks.
  While Gerard was clearly the main impetus for this new activity, it 
was certainly facilitated by the staff and faculty in the Algemeene Eco-
nomie. I thus thank Joan Muysken (and some day, perhaps, I’ll be able to 
pronounce the Dutch "uy" sound!), and also the secretarial staff in the 
Faculty, particularly Silvana deSanctis.
  When I was here a year ago, one of the colleagues mentioned that 
he assumed this position was a part-time job for me during retirement. 
It is part-time – I am here for only one teaching block per year. And I like 
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to think that I will not be working as hard in the next three years as 
in the past 42, although a rational expectations forecast would suggest 
that thought is incorrect. In fact, however, the U.S. has no mandatory 
retirement. I can stay at the University of Texas at Austin until I am no 
longer able to stand in front of a classroom or run a regression. But stay-
ing there would restrict my life and prevent me from enjoying the kind 
of variety that makes life fun. The University of Texas has kindly offered 
me an arrangement where I am paid only half-time, and teach only in 
Fall semester. This allows me to be here – to enjoy the spice of life that 
I covet.
  During each of my two-month stints in Maastricht my wife, Frances, 
will be here with me. I fell in love with her at first sight (I completely 
agree with Paul McCartney) when I saw her at a religious service in New 
Haven, Connecticut, in September 1965. We have been married for 43 
years. She is the mother of our two sons, and the grandmother of our six 
grandchildren. She reads my papers, or at least the less technical ones; 
she has been a continuing sounding board for my ideas, including en-
couraging me to truncate the bad ones; and she has been a consolation 
in times of adversity, which have thankfully been remarkably few. I have 
been blessed in many ways, but most of all, by having met her.
Ik heb gezegd.
